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On Strongly First-Order Dependencies
Pietro Galliani
Abstract We prove that the expressive power of first-order logic with team seman-
tics plus contradictory negation does not rise beyond that of first-order logic (with
respect to sentences), and that the totality atoms of arity k + 1 are not definable
in terms of the totality atoms of arity k. We furthermore prove that all first-order
nullary and unary dependencies are strongly first order, in the sense that they do not
increase the expressive power of first order logic if added to it.
1 Introduction
In the last few years, team semantics [14, 18] has proved itself to be a very powerful
theoretical framework for the study of dependency notions and their interaction; and,
furthermore, some intriguing potential applications of team semantics in the areas
of belief representation [6, 8], social choice and physics [2] and database theory [15]
have been noticed.
As a natural generalization of Tarski’s semantics to the case of multiple assign-
ments, team semantics allows to extend first-order logic in novel ways, in particular
by adding to it dependency atoms that specify complex patterns of dependence and
independence between variables; and much of the research in the area so far has
been dedicated to the comparison of the logics thus obtained.
Many of these logics are much stronger than first-order logic itself – for instance,
dependence logic is as expressive as the existential fragment of second-order logic
[18], and inclusion logic is as expressive as greatest fixed point logic [11] – but this
needs not be the case. Indeed, as shown in [9], many nontrivial dependency notions,
such as for instance the negations of functional dependence, inclusion, exclusion,
and conditional independence, are strongly first-order in the sense that they do not
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increase the expressive power of first-order logic if added to it. The totality atoms,
which assert that a certain tuple of variables takes all possible values in a team, are
an especially interesting example of a strongly first-order dependency, and in this
work we will study them in some depth.
It is important to emphasize here that these strongly first-order dependencies, de-
spite not increasing the expressive power of first-order logic sentences, cannot be
disposed of: even though every sentence containing them (but not other, stronger
dependencies) is logically equivalent to some first-order sentence, the satisfaction
conditions of formulas containing them are not in general equivalent to the satis-
faction conditions of any first-order formula with respect to team semantics. This
disparity between the behaviour of formulas and that of sentences is one of the most
intriguing phenomena of team semantics.
The study of team semantics (and, in particular, of strongly first-order depen-
dencies) can thus be seen as an attempt to investigate the nature of the boundary
between first- and second-order logic; and, from a more practical point of view, de-
pendencies which are strongly first-order are eminently treatable in that they do not
increase the complexity of the logic.
The purpose of this work is to further investigate the properties of strongly first-
order dependencies and – more in general – of team semantics-based extensions
of first-order logic whose expressive power is no greater than that of first-order
logic proper. In Section 3 we will investigate the effect of adding the contradictory
negation operator to extensions of first-order logic by strongly first-order operator;
then in Section 4 we will develop a hierarchy theorem for totality atoms, and in
Sections 5 and 6 we will study dependency atoms of arity 0 or 1.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we will briefly recall some fundamental definitions, as well as some
results that we will need to use later in this work.
Definition 1 (Team). Let M be a first order model with domain M and let V be a set
of variables. A team X over M with domain Dom(X) = V is a set of assignments
s : V →M.
Given such a team X and a tuple v of variables in Dom(X), we write X(v) for the
relation {s(v) : s ∈ X}; and given a first-order formula θ , we write (X ↾ θ ) for the
team {s ∈ X : M |=s θ} obtained by taking only the assignments of X which satisfy
θ (according to Tarski’s semantics).
For the purposes of this work, we will only consider the so-called lax version of
team semantics, and we will only work with formula in negation normal form:
Definition 2. Let M be a first order model, let X be a team over it, and let φ(v) be a
first order formula in negation normal form and with free variables in v⊆ Dom(X).
We say that X satisfies φ(v) in M, and we write M |=X φ(v), if and only if this can
be deduced from the following rules:
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TS-lit: For all first-order literals α , M |=X α if and only if for all s ∈ X , M |=s α
according to Tarski semantics;
TS-∨: M |=X ψ∨θ if and only if there exist Y,Z ⊆ X such that X =Y ∪Z, M |=Y
ψ and M |=Z θ ;
TS-∧: M |=X ψ ∧θ if and only if M |=X ψ and M |=X θ ;
TS-∃: M |=X ∃vψ if and only if there exists a function F : X →P(M)\{ /0} such
that, for Y = X [F/v] = {s[m/v] : m ∈ F(s)}, we have that M |=Y ψ ;
TS-∀: M |=X ∀vψ if and only if M |=X [M/v] ψ , where X [M/v] = {s[m/v] : s ∈
X ,m ∈M}.
A sentence φ is said to be true in a model M if and only if M |={ /0} φ ; and in this
case, we write M |= φ .
The next result shows that, in the case of first-order logic, team semantics may
indeed be reduced to Tarski’s semantics:
Proposition 1 ([18]). For all first-order formulas φ , all models M and all teams X,
M |=X φ if and only if for all s ∈ X we have that M |=s φ according to Tarski’s
semantics. In particular, for all first-order sentences φ we have that M |={ /0} φ if
and only if M |= φ according to Tarski’s semantics.
However, team semantics allows us to extend first-order logic in novel ways, for
instance by operators such as the intuitionistic implication [1]
TS-intimp: M |=X φ → ψ if and only if for all Y ⊆ X , M |=Y φ ⇒M |=Y ψ ,
the contradictory negation [19]
TS-∼: M |=X∼ φ if and only if M 6|=X φ ,
the classical disjunction [18]
TS-⊔: M |=X φ ⊔ψ if and only if M |=X φ or M |=X ψ ,
or the possibility operator [9]
TS-♦: M |=X ♦φ iff there exists a Y ⊆ X , Y 6= /0 s.t. M |=Y φ
or by means of novel atoms corresponding to notions of constancy and functional
dependence [18]
TS-con: M |=X=(v) iff for all s,s′ ∈ X , s(v) = s′(v);
TS-fdep: M |=X=(v,w) iff for all s,s′ ∈ X , s(v) = s′(v)⇒ s(w) = s′(w),
inclusion dependence [7]
TS-inc: M |=X v⊆ w iff X(v)⊆ X(w)
(conditional) independence [12]
TS-ind: M |=X v ⊥u w iff for all s,s′ ∈ X with s(u) = s′(u) there exists a s′′ ∈ X
with s′′(uvw) = s(uv)s′(w).
or totality [2]:
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TS-all: M |=X All(v) iff X(v) = M|v|.
More in general, all these atoms (and many more besides) can be seen as special
cases of the following definition ([17]):
Definition 3 (Dependency Notion). Let k ∈ N. A k-ary dependency notion D is a
class, closed under isomorphisms, of models over the signature {R}, where R is a
k-ary relation symbol. For all models M, all teams X , and all tuples v of variables
in the domain of X ,
M |=X Dv if and only if (M,X(v)) ∈ D.
Given a family D of dependency notions, we will write FO(D) for the logic
obtained by adding all D ∈ D to the language of first-order logic. We will indicate
with =(·) the family of all constancy dependencies =(v) of all arities, with =(·, ·)
the family of all functional dependency atoms =(v,w) of all arities, and with All the
family of all totality atoms All(w) of all arities; and when necessary, we will indicate
the arities as a subscript – for instance, =(·)1 represents the unary constancy atoms
=(v) where v is a single variable, and =(·, ·)2,2 represents the functional dependency
atoms of the form =(v1v2,w1w2).
The following notion of definability is of central importance for the study of team
semantics:
Definition 4 (Definability). Let D be a k-ary dependency notion and let D be a class
of dependency notions. Then we say that D is definable through D if there exists a
formula θ (v) ∈ FO(D) over the empty vocabulary, where v = v1 . . .vk is a tuple of
k distinct variables, such that
M |=X Dv if and only if M |=X θ (v)
for all models M and teams X whose domain contains v.
It is easy to see that FO(=(·)) = FO(=(·)1): indeed, for any k-tuple v = v1 . . .vk
of variable it is trivial to check that =(v)≡
∧k
i=1 =(vi), and hence =(·)k is definable
through =(·)1. On the other hand, in [3] it was shown that
Theorem 1. For all k ∈ N, FO(=(·, ·)k,1)( FO(=(·, ·)k+1,1),1
in [10] it was shown that a similar result holds for independence atoms, and in [13]
it was shown that the same may be said in the case of inclusion atoms too.
What about totality dependencies? We will address this question in Section 4.
All dependencies that we mentioned so far are first-order in the following sense:
Definition 5 (First-Order Dependency Notion). A k-ary dependency notion D is
first-order if and only if there exists a first order formula D∗ on the signature {R}
(for R k-ary) such that
1 To be more precise, this results holds if we are allowing models over all signatures. The case in
which only models over the empty signature are considered is yet open.
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D = {(M,R) : (M,R) |= D∗}.
It is easy to see that if D is first-order then M |=X Dv⇔ (M,X(v)) |= D∗; but owing
to the higher-order nature of team semantics (and in particular, to the second-order
quantification implicit in its rules for disjunctions and existential quantifiers) it does
not follow from this that these dependencies do not increase the expressive power
of first-order logic. For instance, the FO(=(·, ·)1,1)-sentence
∃x∀y∃z(=(z,y)∧ z 6= x)
is true in a model M if and only if it is infinite, even though =(·, ·)1,1 is first-order
and corresponds to the sentence ∀xyy′(Rxy∧Rxy′→ y = y′).
Therefore, the question arises of whether there exist interesting dependency no-
tions for which this is not the case. More formally, one may ask if there exist non-
trivial dependencies which are strongly first-order in the following sense:
Definition 6 (Strongly First Order Dependencies). A k-ary dependency D is
strongly first order if every sentence of FO(D) is equivalent to some sentence of
FO. Similarly, a family of dependencies D is strongly first order if every sentence
of FO(D) is equivalent to some sentence of FO.
In [9], a positive answer was found for the above question.
Definition 7. A dependency notion D is upwards-closed if (M,R) ∈ D,R ⊆ S ⇒
(M,S) ∈ D.
Theorem 2 ([9]). Let D be a family of upwards-closed first-order dependencies.
Then {=(·)}∪D is strongly first order.
As a consequence, it was shown that – for instance – all the following dependencies
are strongly first-order for all arities of v and w, as is any set containing them (and
the constancy atoms =(·)):
TS-nonempty: M |=X NE iff X 6= /0;
TS-ncon: M |=X 6=(v) iff there exist s,s′ ∈ X such that s(v) 6= s′(v);
TS-ndep: M |=X 6=(v,w) iff there exist s,s′ ∈ X with s(v) = s′(v) but s(w) 6=
s′(w);
TS-geq: For all n ∈N, M |=X |v| ≥ n iff |X(v)| ≥ n;
TS-all: M |=X All(v) iff X(v) = M|v|;
TS- 6⊆: M |=X v 6⊆ w iff there exists some s ∈ X such that for all s′ ∈ X , s(v) 6=
s′(w);
TS- 6⊥: M |=X v 6⊥uw iff there exist s,s′ ∈ X with s(u) = s′(u) but such that for
all s′′ ∈ X , s′′(uvw) 6= s(uv)s′(w).
The last two dependencies are not upwards-closed, but as shown in [9] they are
definable in terms of constancy atoms and first-order, upwards-closed dependencies.
We conclude this section by mentioning a few shorthands and results that we will
need to use in the rest of this work:
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Definition 8 (⊤, ⊥). Let v be any variable. Then we write ⊤ for ∀v(v = v) and ⊥
for ∃v(v 6= v).
Proposition 2. For all models M and teams X, M |=X ⊤; and furthermore, M |=X
⊥ if and only if X = /0.
Proof. Obvious.
Definition 9 (Dual Negation). Let φ be a first-order formula in negation normal
form. Then we write ¬φ as a shorthand for the formula thus obtained:
• If φ is a positive literal Rt or t1 = t2, ¬φ is its negation (that is, ¬Rt or t1 6= t2);
• If φ is a negative literal ¬Rt or t1 6= t2, ¬φ is the corresponding positive literal
(that is, Rt or t1 = t2);
• ¬(φ ∨ψ) = (¬φ)∧ (¬ψ);
• ¬(φ ∧ψ) = (¬φ)∨ (¬ψ);
• ¬(∃vφ) = ∀v(¬ψ);
• ¬(∀vφ) = ∃v(¬ψ);
It is not difficult to see, by structural induction on φ , that
Proposition 3. For all first-order formulas φ , all models M and all teams X,
M |=X ¬φ if and only if for all s ∈ X we have that M |=s ¬φ according to Tarski’s
semantics.
Definition 10 (φ ↾ θ ). Let D be any class of dependencies, let φ ∈ FO(D) and let
θ ∈ FO. Then we write φ ↾ θ as a shorthand for
(¬θ )∨ (θ ∧φ)
Proposition 4 ([9]). Let D be any class of dependencies, let φ ∈ FO(D) and let
θ ∈ FO. Then for all suitable models M and teams X,
M |=X φ ↾ θ if and only if M |=X↾θ φ .
Definition 11 (Flattening). Let D be any class of dependencies and let φ ∈FO(NE).
Then we define its flattening φ f as the first-order formula obtained by substituting
all atoms Dv in it with ⊤.
Lemma 1. For all classes of dependencies D , models M, teams X, and formulas
φ ∈ FO(D), if M |=X φ then M |=X φ f .
Proof. Trivial.
Lemma 2 ([9]). Let D be a class of upwards-closed (but not necessarily first-order)
dependencies. Then for all models M, teams X and Y such that X ⊆ Y, and φ ∈
FO(D), if M |=X φ and M |=Y φ f then M |=Y φ .
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Lemma 3 ([9]). Let D be a class of dependencies (not necessarily first-order or
upwards-closed) and let φ(v) be a FO(=(·),D) formula. Then φ(v) is equivalent
to some formula of the form ∃w(=(w)∧ψ(w,v)), where ψ ∈ FO(D) contains the
exactly the same instances of D-atoms (for all D ∈D) that φ does, and in the same
number.
The following simple result - which allows us to add, essentially for free, the
classical disjunction ⊔ to our language – will also be of some use in the rest of this
work:
Proposition 5. Let D be any class of dependencies and let φ ∈ FO(D ,⊔). Then φ
is equivalent to some formula of the form ⊔ni=1 ψi, where all ψi are in FO(D).
Proof. It suffices to show that the ⊔ connective commutes with all other connec-
tives:
• (ψ ⊔ θ )∨ χ ≡ (ψ ∨ χ)⊔ (θ ∨ χ): Suppose that M |=X (ψ ⊔ θ )∨ χ . Then X =
Y ∪ Z for two Y , Z such that M |=Y ψ ⊔ θ and M |=Z χ . By the satisfaction
conditions for ⊔, we have that M |=Y ψ or M |=Y θ . In the first case we have
that M |=X ψ ∨ χ and in the second case we have that M |=X θ ∨ χ , so in either
case M |=X (ψ ∨ χ)⊔ (θ ∨ χ).
Conversely, suppose that M |=X (ψ∨χ)⊔(θ ∨χ). ThenM |=X (ψ∨χ) or M |=X
(θ ∨ χ). In the first case, we have that X = Y ∪ Z for two Y and Z such that
M |=Y ψ and M |=Z χ ; but then M |=Y ψ ⊔θ too, and thus M |=X (ψ ⊔θ )∨ χ .
The case in which M |=X (θ ∨ χ) is dealt with analogously.
• (ψ ⊔θ )∧ χ ≡ (ψ ∧ χ)⊔ (θ ∧ χ): M |=X (ψ ⊔θ )∧ χ iff (M |=X ψ or M |=X θ )
and M |=X χ iff (M |=X ψ and M |=X χ) or (M |=X θ and M |=X χ) iff M |=X
(ψ ∧ χ)⊔ (θ ∧ χ).
• ∃v(ψ ⊔θ ) ≡ (∃vψ)⊔ (∃vθ ): Suppose that M |=X ∃v(ψ ⊔θ ). Then there exists
a choice function F such that M |=X [F/v] ψ or M |=X [F/v] θ . In the first case we
have that M |=X ∃vψ , and in the second case we have that M |=X ∃vθ ; so in
either case M |=X (∃vψ)⊔ (∃vθ ).
Conversely, suppose that M |=X (∃vψ)⊔ (∃vθ ). If M |=X (∃vψ) then there is a
F such that M |=X [F/v] ψ , and therefore M |=X [F/v] ψ ⊔θ , and therefore M |=X
∃v(ψ⊔θ ); and similarly, if M |=X (∃vθ ) there is a F such that M |=X [F/v] θ , and
therefore M |=X [F/v] ψ ⊔θ , and therefore M |=X ∃v(ψ ⊔θ ).
• ∀v(ψ⊔θ )≡ (∀vψ)⊔(∀vθ ):M |=X ∀v(ψ⊔θ ) iffM |=X [M/v] (ψ⊔θ ) iff (M |=X [M/v]
ψ or M |=X [M/v] θ ) iff (M |=X ∀vψ or M |=X ∀vθ ) iff M |=X (∀vψ)⊔ (∀vθ ).
Lemma 4. For all models M and sentences φ1,φ2 ∈ FO,
M |= φ1⊔φ2 ⇔M |= φ1∨φ2.
Proof. Suppose that M |= φ1 ⊔ φ2. Then, by definition, M |={ /0} φi for some i ∈
{1,2}. Suppose, without loss of generality, that M |={ /0} φ1; then since φ2 is first-
order we have that M |= /0 φ2, and hence M |={ /0} φ1 ∨φ2. The case for M |={ /0} φ2
is analogous. Conversely, suppose that M |={ /0} φ2 ∨φ2: then { /0} = Y ∪Z for two
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Y,Z ⊆{ /0} such that Y ∪Z = { /0},M |=Y φ1 and M |=Z φ2. Then Y = { /0} or Z = { /0},
and hence M |= φ1 or M |= φ2 and finally M |= φ1⊔φ2, as required.
Corollary 1. Let D be a strongly first-order class of dependencies. Then every sen-
tence of FO(D ,⊔) is equivalent to some sentence of FO.
Proof. Let φ ∈ FO(D ,⊔). As per the above results, we may assume that φ is of the
form
⊔
i ψi, where all ψi are FO(D)-sentences, and hence equivalent to first-order
sentences ψ ′i . Now let φ ′ =
∨
i ψ ′i .
3 On the Contradictory Negation
It is known from [19] that team logic FO(=(·, ·),∼), that is, the logic obtained by
adding the contradictory negation and functional dependency conditions (of all ari-
ties) to the language of first-order logic, is as expressive as second-order logic over
sentences; and, furthermore, in [16] it was shown that all second-order properties of
teams correspond to the satisfaction conditions of team logic sentences.
But what if we add the contradictory negation to weaker extensions of first-order
logic? Or, for that matter, what if we consider FO(∼), that is, the logic obtained by
adding only the contradictory negation to the language of first-order logic?
In this section, we will prove that
1. Both FO(∼,=(·)) and FO(∼, 6=(·)) are equivalent to full team logic;
2. FO(∼) = FO(NE,⊔) = FO(NE,⊔,∼);
3. Every sentence of FO(NE,⊔) is equivalent to some first-order sentence.
Thus, the contradictory negation alone does not suffice to bring the expressive power
of our logic beyond that of first-order logic, but as soon as we add even simple
strongly first-order dependencies such as constancy or non-constancy we obtain the
full expressive power of second-order logic.
Lemma 5. FO(∼,=(·)) = FO(∼, 6=(·)).
Proof. It suffices to observe that, for any tuple v of variables, 6=(v) is logically
equivalent to ∼=(v) and =(v) is logically equivalent to ∼6=(v).
Lemma 6. For any two tuple v, w of variables, the functional dependence atom
=(v,w) is definable in FO(∼,=(·)).
Proof. Consider the formula
∼ (∃pq1q2(=(p)∧=(q1)∧=(q2)∧q1 6= q2∧∼ (vw 6= pq1)∧∼ (vw 6= pq2)). (1)
It is easy to check that Equation (1) is logically equivalent to =(v,w), as required.
Corollary 2. FO(∼,=(·)) = FO(∼, 6=(·)) = FO(∼,=(·, ·)) = Team Logic.
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So far so good. But what can we say about FO(∼)? In what follows, we will
prove that this logic is not more expressive than first-order logic over sentences;
indeed, it is equivalent to FO(NE,⊔).
Lemma 7. Let ψ ∈ FO(NE) and let θ ∈ FO. Then∼ (ψ ↾ θ ) is logically equivalent
to ((∼ ψ) ↾ θ ).
Proof. Suppose that M |=X∼ (ψ ↾ θ ). Then for Y = {s ∈ X : M |=s θ} we have that
M 6|=Y ψ . But then M |=Y∼ ψ , and thus M |=X ((∼ ψ) ↾ θ ).
Conversely, suppose that M |=X ((∼ ψ) ↾ θ ). Then for Y as above we have that
M 6|=Y ψ ; and therefore, M 6|=X (ψ ↾ θ ), and in conclusion M |=X∼ (ψ ↾ θ ).
Lemma 8. Let φ ∈FO(NE). Then∼ φ is equivalent to some formula in FO(NE,⊔).
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on φ .
1. Suppose that φ is a first-order formula (not necessarily a literal). Then ∼ φ is
logically equivalent to NE ↾ (¬φ). Indeed, suppose that M |=X∼ φ : then, since
φ is first-order, there exists a s ∈ X such that M 6|=s φ according to Tarski’s
semantics. But then s ∈ X ↾ (¬φ), and thus M |=X NE ↾ (¬φ).
Conversely, suppose that M |=X NE ↾ (¬φ). Then the set X ↾ (¬φ) is not empty,
and therefore there exists some s ∈ X which satisfies ¬φ according to Tarski’s
semantics, and finally M 6|=X φ .
2. ∼ NE is easily seen to be equivalent to ⊥, which is true only in the empty team.
3. Suppose that φ is of the form (ψ ∨θ ). Then ∼ φ is logically equivalent to
((∼ ψ) ↾ ψ f )⊔ ((∼ θ ) ↾ θ f )⊔ ∼ (ψ f ∨θ f ). (2)
Indeed, suppose that M |=X∼ (ψ ∨θ ). Then it is not the case that X = Y ∪Z for
two Y , Z such that M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ . In particular, take Y = X ↾ ψ f and
Z = X ↾ θ f : then Y ∪Z 6= X , and hence M |=X∼ (ψ f ∨ θ f ), or M 6|=Y ψ , and
hence M |=X ((∼ ψ) ↾ ψ f ), or M 6|=Z θ , and hence M |=X ((∼ θ ) ↾ θ f ).
Conversely, suppose that M |=X (ψ ∨θ ). Then X = Y ∪Z for two Y,Z such that
M |=Y ψ and M |=Y θ . Now take Y ′ = X ↾ ψ f and Z′ = X ↾ θ f : by Proposition 1
we have that M |=Y ψ f and M |=Z θ f , by Lemma 1 we have that Y ⊆Y ′ and Z ⊆
Z′, and thus X = Y ′∪Z′, and by Lemma 2 we have that M |=Y ′ ψ and M |=Z′ θ .
Therefore M 6|=X (∼ ψ) ↾ ψ f , M 6|=X (∼ θ ) ↾ θ f , and M |=X (ψ f ∨θ f ), so in
conclusion X does not satisfy Equation (2).
4. Suppose that φ is of the form (ψ ∧ θ ). Then ∼ φ is logically equivalent to (∼
ψ)⊔ (∼ θ ).
5. Suppose that φ is of the form (∃vψ). Then ∼ φ is logically equivalent to
∼ (∃vψ f )⊔∀v((∼ ψ) ↾ ψ f ) (3)
Indeed, suppose that M |=X∼ (∃vψ) and M |=X ∃vψ f , and consider the choice
function F such that F(s) = {m : M |=s[m/v] ψ f }. F(s) is nonempty for all s ∈ X ,
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since M |=X ∃vψ f ; and therefore, by hypothesis, M 6|=X [F/v] ψ . But by construc-
tion, we have that X [F/v] = X [M/v] ↾ ψ f , and thus M 6|=X [M/v] ψ ↾ ψ f , and
finally M |=X ∀v((∼ ψ) ↾ ψ f ).
Conversely, suppose that there exists a choice function F : X →P(M)\{ /0} such
that M |=X [F/v] ψ . Then in particular M |=X [F/v] ψ f , and hence M |=X ∃vψ f
and M 6|=X∼ (∃vψ f ); and furthermore, we have that X [F/v]⊆ X [M/v] ↾ ψ f , and
therefore M |=X [M/v] ψ ↾ ψ f and M 6|=X [M/v] (∼ ψ) ↾ ψ f . So in conclusion the
team X does not satisfy Equation (3).
6. Suppose that φ is of the form (∀vψ). Then∼ φ is logically equivalent to ∀v∼ψ :
indeed, M |=X∼ φ iff M 6|=X ∀vψ iff M 6|=X [M/v] ψ iff M |=X [M/v]∼ ψ iff M |=X
∀v∼ ψ .
We are now equipped to prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 3. Let φ ∈FO(NE,⊔). Then∼ φ is equivalent to some formula in FO(NE,⊔).
Proof. By Proposition 5, we may assume that φ is of the form ⊔ni=1 ψi, where each
ψi is in FO(NE). Thus,∼ φ is logically equivalent to ∧ni=1(∼ ψi); and by the above
lemma, if ψi is in FO(NE) then ∼ ψi is in FO(NE,⊔), as required.
The two following corollaries then follow at once:
Corollary 3. FO(NE,⊔,∼) = FO(NE,⊔).
Corollary 4. FO(∼)⊆ FO(NE,⊔).
We still need to show the other direction of the equivalence between FO(NE,⊔)
and FO(∼):
Proposition 6. FO(NE,⊔)⊆ FO(∼).
Proof. It suffices to show that the nonemptiness atom and the classical disjunction
are definable in FO(∼). As for the former, observe that M |=X∼ ⊥ if an only if X
is nonempty; and for the latter, observe that φ ⊔ψ is logically equivalent to ∼ ((∼
φ)∧ (∼ ψ)).
Putting everything together, we have that
Theorem 4. FO(∼) = FO(NE,⊔).
Finally, we need to prove that every sentence of FO(NE,⊔) is equivalent to some
first-order sentence. But this is immediate:
Theorem 5. Let φ ∈ FO(NE,⊔) be a sentence. Then φ is logically equivalent to
some φ ′ ∈ FO.
Proof. By Proposition 5 we may assume that φ is of the form ⊔ni=1 ψi, where each
ψi is a sentence in FO(NE). But then by Theorem 2, each ψi is equivalent to some
first-order sentence ψ ′i , and thus φ is equivalent to the first-order sentence
∨n
i=1 ψ ′i .
Corollary 5. The constancy and inconstancy atoms are not definable in FO(NE,⊔).
Proof. If they were then we would have that FO(=(·, ·),∼) ⊆ FO(NE,⊔); but this
is not possible, because FO(NE,⊔) is strongly first-order and FO(=(·, ·),∼) is as
strong as second-order logic.
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4 Arity Hierarchies for Totality Atoms
In this section we will investigate the properties of the k-ary totality atoms Allk, and
we we establish a strict arity hierarchy for them.
Let us begin by generalizing a notion from [9]:
Definition 12 (γ-boundedness). Let γ : N→ N be a function. Then a dependency
notion D is said to be γ-bounded if for all finite models M and teams X , if M |=X D
then there exists a subteam Y ⊆ X , |Y | ≤ γ(|M|), such that M |=Y D.
Proposition 7. All k-ary dependencies D are |M|k-bounded.
Proof. Suppose that M |=X Dv. Then (M,X(v)) ∈ D; and since X(v) ⊆ Mk, it is
clear that |X(v)| ≤ |M|k. Now for any m∈ X(v), let sm ∈ X be such that sm(v) = m,
and let Y = {sm : m∈ X(v)}. Then |Y | ≤ |M|k and Y (v) = X(v), and thus M |=Y Dv.
Theorem 6. Let D = {Di : i ∈ I} be a class of upwards-closed dependencies, for
every Di ∈ D let γi : N→ N be such that Di is γi-bounded, let φ ∈ FO(D) be such
that every Di occurs ki times, and let νφ (n) = Σi∈Ikiγi(n). Then φ is νφ -bounded, in
the sense that
M |=X φ ⇒∃Y ⊆ X , |Y | ≤ νφ (|M|),M |=Y φ
for all finite models M and all teams X.
Proof. The proof is by induction, and mirrors the analogous proof from [9].
1. If φ is a first order literal then it is 0-bounded (since the empty team satisfies it),
as required.
2. If φ is an atom Dx then the statement follows at once from the definitions of
boundedness.
3. Let φ be a disjunction ψ1 ∨ψ2 then νφ = νψ1 + νψ2 . Suppose now that M |=X
ψ1∨ψ2: then X = X1∪X2 for two X1 and X2 such that M |=X1 ψ1 and M |=X2 ψ2.
This implies that there exist Y1 ⊆ X1, Y2 ⊆ X2 such that M |=Y1 ψ1 and M |=Y2 ψ2,
|Y1| ≤ νψ1(|M|) and |Y2| ≤ νψ2(|M|). But then Y = Y1∪Y2 satisfies ψ1∨ψ2 and
has at most νψ1(|M|)+νψ2(|M|) elements.
4. If φ is a conjunction ψ1 ∧ψ2 then, again, νφ = νψ1 + νψ2 . Suppose that M |=X
ψ1 ∧ψ2: then M |=X ψ1 and M |=X ψ2, and therefore by Lemma 1 M |=X ψ f1
and M |=X ψ f2 ; and, by induction hypothesis, there exist Y1,Y2 ⊆ X with |Y1| ≤
νψ1(|M|), |Y2| ≤ νψ2(|M|), M |=Y1 ψ1 and M |=Y2 ψ2. Now let Y =Y1∪Y2: since
Y ⊆ X , by Proposition 1 M |=Y ψ f1 and M |=Y ψ
f
2 . But Y1,Y2 ⊆ Y , and therefore
by Lemma 2 M |=Y ψ1 and M |=Y ψ2, and in conclusion M |=Y ψ1∧ψ2.
5. If φ is of the form ∃vψ then νφ = νψ . Suppose that M |=X ∃vψ : then for some
F we have that M |=X [F/v] ψ , and therefore by induction hypothesis there exists
a Z ⊆ X [F/v] with |Z| ≤ νψ (|M|) such that M |=Z ψ . For any h ∈ Z, let f(h) be
a s ∈ X such that h ∈ s[F/v] = {s[m/v] : m ∈ F(s)},2 and let Y = {f(h) : h ∈ Z}.
2 Since Z ⊆ X [F/v], such a s always exists. Of course, there may be multiple ones; in that case, we
just pick arbitrarily one.
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Now Z ⊆Y [F/v]⊆ X [F/v]. Since M |=X [F/v] ψ f and Y [F/v]⊆ X [F/v], we have
that M |=Y [F/v] ψ f ; and since M |=Z ψ , this implies that M |=Y [F/v] ψ and that
M |=Y ∃vψ . Furthermore |Y | ≤ |Z| ≤ νφ (|M|), as required.
6. If φ is of the form ∀vψ then, again, νφ = νψ . Suppose that M |=X [M/v] ψ : again,
by induction hypothesis there is a Z ⊆ X [M/v] with |Z| ≤ νψ (|M|) and such that
M |=Z ψ . For any h ∈ Y , let g(h) pick some s ∈ X which agrees with h on all
variables except possibly v, and let Y = {g(h) : h ∈ Z}. Similarly to the previ-
ous case, Z ⊆ Y [M/v] ⊆ X [M/v]: therefore, since M |=X [M/v] ψ f we have that
M |=Y [M/v] ψ f , and since M |=Z ψ we have that M |=Y [M/v] ψ . So in conclusion
M |=Y ∀vψ , as required, and |Y | ≤ |Z| ≤ νφ (M).
Using some care, we can extend this result to the case of FO(=(·),D ,⊔):
Theorem 7. Let D = {Di : i ∈ I} be a class of upwards-closed dependencies, for
every Di ∈ D let γi : N→ N be such that Di is γi-bounded, let φ ∈ FO(=(·),D ,⊔)
be such that every Di occurs ki times, and let νφ (n) = Σi∈Ikiγi(n). Then φ is νφ -
bounded, in the sense that
M |=X φ ⇒∃Y ⊆ X , |Y | ≤ νφ (|M|),M |=Y φ .
Proof. By Proposition 5, we can assume that φ is of the form ⊔ni=1 ψi, where all ψi
are in FO(=(·),D). Furthermore, by Lemma 3 we can assume that every ψi is of the
form ∃wi(=(wi)∧θi), for θi ∈ FO(D) and all tuples of variables wi are new. Now
suppose that M |=X φ : then there exists an i ∈ 1 . . .n and a tuple of elements m ∈M
such that M |=X [m/wi] θi. But then there exists a Y ⊆ X [m/wi], |Y | ≤ νθi(|M|), such
that M |=Y φ . Now let Z be the restriction of Y to the domain of X : clearly Z ⊆ X
and |Z| ≤ |Y | ≤ νθi(|M|) ≤ νφ (|M|), and furthermore M |=Z ∃wi(=(wi)∧θi) and
so in conclusion M |=Z φ .
Theorem 8. Let k′ > k, and let D be a class of k-ary upwards-closed (not necessar-
ily first-order) dependencies. Then Allk′ is not definable in FO(=(·),D ,⊔).
Proof. Suppose that φ(v) ∈ FO(=(·),D ,⊔) defines Allk′ . Then, since all depen-
dencies in D are |M|k-bounded, we have at once that φ is q|M|k-bounded for some
q ∈ N. Now let n ∈ N be such that nk′ > qnk, let M be a model in the empty signa-
ture with n elements, let v be a tuple of k′ variables, and let X = { /0}[M/v]. Then
M |=X Allk′v, and therefore M |=X φ(v). But then there must be a Y ⊆ X , |Y | ≤ qnk,
such that M |=Y φ(v); and this is not possible, because for such a Y we would have
that M 6|=Y Allk′x.
In particular, it follows at once from this that Allk+1 is not definable in FO(=
(·),Allk,⊔). On the other hand if k′ < k the operator Allk′v is easily seen to be defin-
able as ∀w(Allkvw); therefore
Corollary 6. For all k ∈ N, FO(=(·),Allk,⊔) ( FO(=(·),Allk+1,⊔) (and all these
logics are equivalent to first-order logic over sentences).
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5 0-ary Dependencies: Escaping the Empty Team
As a limit case of the notion of dependency, we have that
Definition 13. A 0-ary dependency D is a set of models over the empty signature.
For all models M and teams X , M |=X D if and only if M ∈ D.
If a 0-ary dependency is first-order, we have that M |=X D if and only if M |= D∗,
where D∗ is a sentence over the empty signature; therefore, it is natural to generalize
them all to an operator [·] of the form
TS-[·]: For all first-order sentences φ in the signature of M, M |=X [φ ] if and only
if M |= φ according to the usual Tarski semantics.
Whenever X is nonempty it follows at once from Proposition 1 that M |=X [φ ] if
and only if M |=X φ ; but since M |= /0 φ for all first-order sentences φ , in first-order
logic with team semantics we have no way of verifying whether a given first-order
sentence is true of our model when we are considering satisfiability with respect to
the empty team. Therefore, we will add this [·] operator to our language. It is easy
to see that adding it to a strongly first-order extension of first-order logic does not
break the property of being strongly first-order:
Proposition 8. Let D be any family of dependencies, and let φ ∈FO(D , [·]). Then φ
is logically equivalent to some sentence of the form ∧i[θi]∧ψ , where ψ ∈ FO(D).
Proof. The proof is by induction on φ , and it is entirely straightforward. We report
only the case of disjunction:
• For all first-order sentences θi, θ ′j and all FO(D) formulas ψ1,ψ2 we have that
(
∧
i[θi]∧ψ1)∨(
∧
j[θ ′j]∧ψ2) is logically equivalent to
∧
i[θi]∧
∧
j[θ ′j ]∧(ψ1∨ψ2).
Indeed, suppose that X = Y ∪ Z for two Y , Z such that M |=Y
∧
i[θi]∧ψ1 and
M |=Z
∧
j[θ ′j]∧ψ2. Then M |=
∧
i θi∧
∧
j θ ′j, and thereforeM |=X
∧
i[θi]∧
∧
j[θ ′j];
and since M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ , we also have that M |=X ψ ∨ θ , and so in
conclusion M |=X
∧
i[θi]∧
∧
j[θ ′j]∧ (ψ1∨ψ2).
The other direction is similar: if M |=
∧
i θi ∧
∧
j θ ′j and M |=X ψ1 ∨ψ2 then
X = Y ∪Z for two Y and Z such that M |=Y ψ1 and M |=Z ψ2. But then M |=Y∧
i[θi]∧ψ1 and M |=Z
∧
j[θ j ]∧ψ2, and so in conclusion M |=X (
∧
i[θi]∧ψ1)∨
(
∧
j[θ ′j]∧ψ2).
Therefore we have the following result:
Proposition 9. Let D be a strongly first-order class of dependencies and let φ ∈
FO(D , [·]) be a sentence. Then φ is logically equivalent to some first-order sentence
φ ′, in the sense that M |={ /0} φ if and only if M |= φ ′.
Proof. We may assume that φ is on the form ∧i[θi]∧ψ , where ψ is a FO(D)-
sentence. Now since D is strongly first-order, ψ is equivalent to some first-order ψ ′;
and since { /0} is nonempty, we can take φ ′ =∧i θi∧ψ .
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6 Unary Dependencies
We will now consider the case of unary dependencies, that is, of dependence atoms
of arity one. As we will see, all first-order unary dependencies are strongly first-
order and definable in FO(=(·), [·],All1,⊔).
In order to prove this we will make use of the following standard result:
Lemma 9. Let φ be a first-order sentence over the vocabulary {P}, where P is
unary. Then φ is logically equivalent to a Boolean combination of sentences of the
form ∃=kxPx and ∃=kx¬Px.
Therefore, in order to show that all unary dependencies are in FO(=(·), [·],All1,⊔)
it suffices to show that the following four dependencies are in it:
TS-eq-pos: For all k ∈ N, M |=X |v|= k iff |X(v)|= k;
TS-neq-pos: For all k ∈ N, M |=X |v| 6= k iff |X(v)| 6= k;
TS-eq-neg: For all k ∈ N, M |=X |M− v|= k iff |M\X(v)|= k;
TS-neq-neg: For all k ∈N, M |=X |M− v| 6= k iff |M\X(v)| 6= k.
Let us prove that this is the case.
Lemma 10. The nonemptiness atom NE is definable in FO(All1) as ∀qAll1q.
Proof. Suppose that M |=X NE, that is, X 6= /0, and let s ∈ X . Then for all m ∈ M,
s[m/q] ∈ X [M/v], and thus X [M/q](q) = M, and thus M |=X ∀qAll1q as required.
However, if X = /0 we have that X [M/q] = /0 too, and thus X [M/q](q) = /0 6= M,
and finally M 6|=X ∀qAll1q.
Definition 14. For all k ∈ N and all variables v, we define the following formulas:
φ≤k(v) = ∃p1 . . . pk(
∧
i
=(pi)∧
k∨
i=1
v = pi);
φ≥k(v) = ∃p1 . . . pk(
∧
i
=(pi)∧
∧
i6= j
pi 6= p j ∧
∧
i
(NE ↾ v = pi));
ψ≤k(v) = [∃≤kx(x = x)]⊔∃p1 . . . pk(
∧
i
=(pi)∧∃q(All1(q)∧ (
∨
i
q = pi∨q = v);
ψ≥k(v) = (⊥∧ [∃≥kx(x = x)])⊔ (NE∧∃p1 . . . pk(
∧
i
=(p1)∧
∧
i6= j
pi 6= p j ∧
k∧
i=1
v 6= pi))
Proposition 10. For all k∈N, all variables v, all models M and all nonempty teams
X whose domain contains v,
• M |=X φ≤k(v) if and only if |X(v)| ≤ k;
• M |=X φ≥k(v) if and only if |X(v)| ≥ k;
• M |=X ψ≤k(v) if and only if |M\X(v)| ≤ k;
• M |=X ψ≥k(v) if and only if |M\X(v)| ≥ k.
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Proof.
• Suppose that M |=X φ≤k(v) and X is nonempty: then there exist elements
m1 . . .mk such that for Y = X [m1 . . .mk/p1 . . . pk], M |=Y
∨k
i=1 v = pi. But then
X(v) ⊆ {m1 . . .mk}, and thus |X(v)| ≤ k. If instead X is empty then trivially
|X(v)|= 0≤ k.
Conversely, suppose that X(v) = {m1, . . .mk′} for k′ ≤ k. Then for
Y = X [m1 . . .mk′ . . .mk′/p1 . . . pk] we have that M |=Y
∨k
i=1 v = pi. Thus M |=X
φ≤k(v), as required.
• Suppose that M |=X φ≥k(v). Then there exist distinct elements m1 . . .mk such that
for Y = X [m1 . . .mk/p1 . . . pk] and for all i ∈ 1 . . .k, M |=Y NE ↾ v = pi. Thus for
all such i there exists a s∈Y with s(v) = s(pi) =mi, and thus |X(v)|= |Y (v)| ≥ k.
Conversely, suppose that {m1 . . .mk} ⊆ X(v), where all mi are distinct. Now take
Y = X [m1 . . .mk/p1 . . . pk]: clearly M |=Y
∧
i =(pi)∧
∧
i6= j pi 6= p j, and it remains
to show that for all i M |=Y NE ↾ v= pi. But Y ↾ (v = pi) = {s∈Y : s(v) = s(pi) =
mi} is nonempty by hypothesis, and this concludes the proof.
• Suppose that M |=X ψ≤k(v). If M |=X [∃≤kx(x = x)] we have that |M| ≤ k,
from which it follows at once that |M\X(v)| ≤ |M| ≤ k. Otherwise, we can
find elements m1 . . .mk such that, for Y = X [m1 . . .mk/p1 . . . pk], there exists
a choice function F for which M |=Y [F/q] All1(q)∧ (
∨
i q = pi ∨ q = v). Then
M\X(v) must be contained in {m1 . . .mk}, since q takes all possible values and
s(q) 6∈ {m1 . . .mk}⇒ s(q) = s(v).
Conversely, suppose that M\X(v)⊆ {m1 . . .mk}. If X 6= /0, let Y be
X [m1 . . .mk/p1 . . . pk], and for all s ∈ Y let F(s) = {m1 . . .mk} ∪ {s(v)}. Then
Y [F/q] |= All1q: indeed, if m ∈ {m1 . . .mk} then m ∈ F(s) for all s ∈ Y , and
otherwise m = s(x) for some s ∈ Y (and hence m ∈ F(s) for this choice of s).
Furthermore, for all h ∈ Y [F/q], if h(q) 6∈ {m1 . . .mk} then we have that h(q) =
h(v), as required. If instead X = /0 then |M| = |M\X(v)| ≤ k, and hence M |=X
∃≤kx(x = x).
• Suppose that M |=X ψ≥k(v) and X 6= /0. Then there exist distinct elements
m1 . . .mk such that for Y = X [m1 . . .mk/p1 . . . pk], M |=Y
∧k
i=1 v 6= pi. There-
fore {m1 . . .mk} ∈ M\X , and thus |M\X | ≥ k. If instead X = /0 then M |=
⊥∧ [∃≥kx(x = x)] and hence |M|= |M\X(v)| ≥ k as required.
Conversely, suppose that |M\X(v)| ≥ k. If X is nonempty we can choose ele-
ments m1 . . .mk ∈ M\X(v) and verify that M |=X [m1...mk/p1...pk]
∧
i6= j pi 6= p j ∧∧
i v 6= pi; and if X is empty then it follows at once that |M| ≥ k and hence that
M |=X ⊥∧ [∃
≥kx(x = x)], as required.
Corollary 7. For all k ∈ N, the atoms |v|= k, |v| 6= k, |M− v| = k and |M− v| 6= k
are all definable in FO(=(·),All1,⊔).
Proof. Observe that
• M |=X |v|= k iff M |=X φ≤k(v)∧φ≥kφ ;
• M |=X |v| 6= k iff M |=X φ≤k−1(v)⊔φ≥k+1(v);
• M |=X |M− v|= k iff M |=X ψ≤k(v)∧ψ≥k(v);
• M |=X |M− v| 6= k iff M |=X ψ≤k−1(v)⊔ψ≥k+1(v)
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where we let φ≤−1 = ψ≤−1 =⊥.
Putting everything together, we have that
Theorem 9. Every unary first-order dependency is definable in FO(=(·),All1,⊔).
Proof. Let D be a unary first-order dependency and let v be a first-order variable.
By definition, M |=X Dv if and only if (M,X(v)) |= D∗(P), where D∗(P) is a first-
order formula in the vocabulary {P} (P unary). But then D∗(P) is equivalent to a
Boolean combination of sentences of the form ∃=kxPx and ∃=kx¬Pk; and thus, we
may assume that D∗(P) is of the form
∨
i
∧
j θi j , where each θi j is ∃=kxPx, ∃=kx¬Px,
or a negation of a formula of this kind. But then Dv is logically equivalent to
⊔
i
∧
j
θ ′i j ,
where
• If θi j is ∃=kxPx, θ ′i j is |v|= k;
• If θi j is ¬∃=kxPx, θ ′i j is |v| 6= k;
• If θi j is ∃=kx¬Px, θ ′i j is |M− v|= k;
• If θi j is ¬∃=kx¬Px, θ ′i j is |M− v| 6= k.
Finally, we need to show that every sentence of FO(=(·), [·],All1,⊔) is equivalent
to some first-order sentence. But this is straightforward:
Theorem 10. Let φ ∈ FO(=(·),All1,⊔, [·]) be a sentence. Then φ is logically equiv-
alent to some first-order sentence.
Proof. By Proposition 5, φ is equivalent to some sentence of the form ⊔iψi, for
ψi ∈ FO(=(·),All1, [·]). Observe further that all expressions [θ ] which occur in our
formulas are such that θ is a first-order sentence over the empty vocabulary; and
therefore, these expressions are trivially upwards-closed first-order dependencies,
since for any fixed model they either hold in all teams or in none of them.3 Then by
Theorem 2 and Proposition 9 every such sentence is equivalent to some first-order
sentence ψ ′i and thus φ is equivalent to
∨
i ψ ′i .
Putting everything together, we have that
Corollary 8. Let D be a unary first-order dependency. Then it is strongly first-order
and definable in FO(=(·), [·],All1,⊔).
We conclude this section by mentioning an open problem.
Question: Let k > 1. Are there any strongly first-order k-ary dependencies which
are not definable in FO(=(·), [·],Allk,⊔)?
3 On the other hand, if θ were a first-order sentence over the non-empty vocabulary then it would
not be a dependency.
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7 Conclusion
Much of the team semantics research has so far focused on formalisms which are
greatly more expressive than first-order logic. However, the study of weaker exten-
sions of first-order logic, which do not rise above it insofar as the definability of
classes of models is concerned, promises to be also of significant value: not only
this investigation offers an opportunity of examining the nature of the boundary
between first- and second-order logic, but it also provides us with (comparatively)
computationally “safe” classes of dependencies and operators to use in applications.
This work builds on the results of [9] and can only be an initial attempt of mak-
ing sense of the wealth of these “weak” extensions of first-order logic with team
semantics. Much of course remains to be done; but a few distinctive characteristics
of this line of investigation may be gleaned already.
• The totality atoms Allk seem to have a role of particular relevance in the theory
of strongly first-order dependencies. It remains to be seen whether this role will
be preserved by the further developments of the theory; but in any case, the fact
that these atoms are the “maximally unbounded” (in the sense of Definition 12)
ones for their arities is certainly suggestive, as is the existence of a strict defin-
ability hierarchy based on their arities and the fact that all monadic first-order
dependencies are definable in terms of the All1 atom.
• The logic FO(∼) = FO(NE,⊔), as the simplest extension of first-order logic
with team semantics which is closed under contradictory negation, is also an
item of particular interest. As we saw, it suffices to add to it comparatively harm-
less dependencies such as constancy atoms to obtain the full expressive power of
second-order logic; thus, despite its simplicity, this logics appears to be a natu-
ral “stopping point” in the family of dependency-based extensions of first-order
logic, deserving of a more in-depth study of its properties.
• When working with classes of strongly first-order dependencies, different choices
of connectives and operators emerge to the foreground. In particular, the role of
the classical disjunction φ ⊔ψ in the study of dependence logic and its extensions
has been relatively marginal so far; but nonetheless, this connective proved itself
of fundamental importance for many of the results of this work. More in general,
it appears now that a fully satisfactory account of dependencies and definability
cannot be developed if not by integrating it with a general theory of operators
and uniform definability in team semantics. The work of [4, 5, 17] on general-
ized quantifiers in team semantics seems to be the most natural starting point for
such an enterprise; in particular, it would be worthwhile to be able to charac-
terize general families of dependencies and operators which do not increase the
expressive power of first-order logic (wrt sentences).
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